









ESTIMATING RELATIONSHIPS IN SIMULATION




K.J. Euske, G W. Thomas, an<i LCDR D.F. Smi th
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited
Prepared for: The Office of the Assistant Secretary







Rear Admiral R.Hc Shumaker D.A. Schrady
Superintendent Provost
The work herein was supported in part by the Office of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense (MRA&L).
Reproduction of all or part of this report is authorized
This report was prepared by:
OOL
unclassified
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Data Entered)
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE READ INSTRUCTIONSBEFORE COMPLETING FORM
1. REPORT NUMBER
NPS 54-85-010
2. GOVT ACCESSION NO. 3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER
4. TITLE (and Subtitle)
Estimating Relationships in Simulation Models
Using Regression: An Application to Military
Retirement Costing.
5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED
6 PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER
7. AUTHORfsj
George Thomas Kenneth Euske
LCDR Donald Smith
8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(»)
9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93943
10. PROGRAM ELEMENT. PROJECT, TASK
AREA ft WORK UNIT NUMBERS
MIPR # DWMC0023
11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Manpower, Installations, and Logistics)
12. REPORT DATE
September 1985
13. NUMBER OF PAGES
25
M MONITORING AGENCY NAME 4 AODRESSf// dltterent from Controlling Office) 15. SECURITY CLASS, (ol thla report)
Unclassified
15a. DEC LASSIFI CATION DOWN GRADING
SCHEDULE
16. DISTRIBUTION ST ATEM EN T (of this Report)
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.
17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abstract entered In Block 20, If different from Report)
18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse aide If neceaaary and Identity by block number)
20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverae aide If neceaaary and Identity by block number)
(see over)
DD
, ^73 1473 EDITION OF 1 NOV 65 IS OBSOLETE
S/N 0102-LF-014-6601
unclassified
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Data Bntarad)
unclassified
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Data Entered)
This article demonstrates a procedure for using regression analysis to
develop estimating equations that simply and quickly predict the effects
on system performance of changes in parametric values of complex inter-
relationships imbedded in a full simulation model. Though an analytic
solution to the relationships may be possible, the time and other
resources necessary to generate such a solution may exceed those available.
The resulting estimating equations facilitate understanding of the system
being simulated, enable users to more easily conduct sensitivity analysis
and answer what-if questions, and assist the "selling" of the simulation
results to potential users. The procedure includes criteria for selection
of: variables to be analyzed, the sensitivity range, the value increments,
and the functional form. The example utilized is a simulation model
developed for estimating future military retirement costs.
unclassified
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGEfWhen Data Entered)
ESTIMATING RELATIONSHIPS IN














LCDR Donald F. Smith Jr., SC, USN
August 1985
Funding for this research was provided by the Office
of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower,
Installations, and Logistics). The views expressed
in this paper do not necessarily represent those of
the Department of Defense.

ESTIMATING RELATIONSHIPS IN SIMULATION MODELS
USING REGRESSION : AN APPLICATION TO MILITARY RETIREMENT COSTING
ABSTRACT
This article demonstrates a procedure for using regression analysis to
develop estimating equations that simply and quickly predict the effects on
system performance of changes in parametric values of complex
interrelation-ships imbedded in a full simulation model. Though an analytic
solution to the relationships may be possible, the time and other resources
necessary to generate such a solution may exceed those available. The
resulting estimating equations facilitate understanding of the system being
simulated, enable users to more easily conduct sensitivity analysis and
answer what-if questions, and assist the "selling" of the simulation results
to potential users. The procedure includes criteria for selection of:
variables to be analyzed, the sensitivity range, the value increments, and the
functional form. The example utilized is a simulation model developed for
estimating future military retirement costs.

ESTIMATING RELATIONSHIPS IN SIMULATION MODELS
USING REGRESSION: AN APPLICATION TO MILITARY RETIREMENT COSTING
One of the main strengths of a mathematical model that represents real
systems is its ability to provide insight into the cause-and-ef feet
relationships within the system. The model abstracts the essence of the
problem and reveals underlying structure of the system . Often, however, it
is not possible to construct a mathematical model that is both a reasonable
idealization of the problem and amenable to solution. Some real -world
situations are very difficult to represent in concise models because of
complexity and stochastic relationships. In these instances, simulation often
provides the only practical approach to a problem.
It is often necessary to obtain generalizations of simulation results to
facilitate understanding of the system being simulated, the "selling" of the
simulation results to potential users, and to enable users to more easily
conduct sensitivity analysis (Kleijnen, 1977). A simulation describes overall
behavior of a system in terms of interrelationships of individual parameters of
the system. The specific relationship between a parameter of the system and
the overall performance of the system is embedded in the simulation model.
And, unfortunately, the complex relationships of the system are often not
tractable to straightforward analytical simplification resulting in the
resources required to generate the analytic solution exceeding the potential
benefits. In these instances, it may be possible to use regression analysis to
develop simplified estimating equations that impound the cause-and-ef feet
relationships reflected in the simulation model and, hence, permit the
prediction of the system's behavior.
The purpose of this paper is to present guidelines for using a regression
procedure to estimate equations that simply and quickly predict the result of
changes in parameter values of complex interrelationships embedded in a
mathematical simulation model. The example used is a simulation model
developed for estimating future military retirement costs. 1 The ability to
evaluate the impact on retirement costs of changes in the underlying
assumptions and parameters is important because manpower policy makers are
expected to include retirement costs in their manpower decisions and therefore
must estimate the responsiveness of retirement costs to alternative decisions.
The procedure utilized in this effort is a simplified development of
regression metamodels for generalizing simulation results (Kleijnen, 1977;
Friedman and Friedman, 1984). In brief, the process used to
develop the estimating equations from the simulation model was:
1. select independent variables for analysis
2. identify the functional form of the relationship of the independent
variable to system performance
3. select range and step values for variables of interest
4. select baseline values for the full simulation model
5. run the full simulation model for each of the variables of interest
of the range selected
6. use the output of the previous steps to develop the regression
equations.
The following sections present the example simulation model and then
discuss criteria for selection of: variables to be analyzed, the functional
forms to be tested in the regression phase, the range over which the analysis
will be conducted, the step values to use for each parametric analysis, the
selection of the baseline values for the simulation, and the regression
equations resulting from the analysis. Additionally, the estimation of joint
effects is dis-cussed.
SIMULATION MODEL
The costs currently being incurred for future military retirees have been
accounted for on a pay-as-you-go basis which has tended to understate the
costs of current manpower decisions (Aeila, 1980; CBO, 1978). In order to
capture the full cost of manpower decisions, actuarial estimates of future
retirement costs have been developed (U.S. Department of Defense, 1983).
Waterman's review of accounting procedures used in the private and military
sector to account for pension costs concluded that the individual entry age
normal method is the most appropriate for modelling retirement cost changes
for the active military (Waterman, 1983). Waterman's mathematical model along
with a set of baseline economic and actuarial assumptions were used to develop
a computer simulation model to estimate future retirement costs (Smith,
1983). 2
The entry age normal technique levies a constant amount for each year's
employment. Differences between actuarial assumptions and actual outcomes can
cause gains and losses to the fund and therefore impact the flat rate
assessment. This flat rate assessment, called the normal cost, is adjusted
for the value of these minor gains and losses by amortizing them over the
remaining working life of the participants (Dreher, 1967). Individual entry
age normal calculations use the variables listed in Appendix A. In addition to
the general form age entry normal variables, the military-retirement-specific




Once the simulation model was operating, the regression equations could
then be developed. The first step was to select the variables for analysis.
The variables for which estimating equations were desired consist of two
types. The first type are the discretionary management policy variables. The
second type of variables are those that reflect important environmental
factors that are likely to change. Even though the second type of variable is
uncontrollable from the viewpoint of management, its impact on overall system
performance must be predicted in order to conduct planning properly for future
periods.
The following type-one variables were chosen for parametric analysis:
length of service at retirement, probability of an entrant reaching
retirement, length of service required, maximum percentage of base pay allowed
for retirement, percent of base pay earned for retirement, and rate of salary
increase. None of these variables are completely controllable by management,
yet each of them can be altered by management policies affecting hiring rates,
promotion/retention rates, retirement eligibility, and compensation. The
type-two variables include, the annual discount rate and life expectancy at
retirement.
The "controllability" of a, van" able is dependent upon the managerial
level which can influence it. For this analysis controllability is defined as
having administrative or legal control. For instance, the annual discount rate
is relatively uncontrollable at all levels throughout the government because
its value is determined by the external market forces which affect not only
the cost of government borrowing but also the cost of private debt. The rate
of salary increase is controlled by Congress and is tied to both the projected
inflation rate and Congressional perception of military retention. The length
of service at retirement and length of service required to retire can be
controlled by stretching time-in-service requirements for advancements and by
adjusting the current acceptable time-in-service for retirement (currently 20
years), up to the legal maximum of 30 years with no Congressional action.
Life expectancy at retirement is a function of multiple environmental effects.
The entrant retirement probability is controllable by the military services by
adjusting advancement opportunities and by reduction-in-force actions. Both
the percent of base pay at retirement and the maximum allowed percent of base
pay, are legislated by the Congress and, therefore, though controllable at a
higher level, are uncontrollable by the Department of Defense.
SELECTION OF FUNCTION FORM
Given the set of variables chosen for parametric analysis, the function
form could be selected. Two distinct procedures were used in the selection of
functional form. The first was an analysis of the basic relationships in the
model. The variety of functional forms used in these relationships signaled a
set of forms to be tested for the regression analysis. For instance, the
basic functional relationships in the entry age normal equation include
linear, polynominal , and log-linear forms. The second procedure used for
selecting functional forms was exploratory data analysis (Tukey, 1977).
RANGE AND STEP VALUE SELECTION
Variable range selection is mainly based on precedent. When simulating a
system that has sufficient history, recent data can be used to bound the
likely values for changes in parameters. The variables selected for analysis
of military retirement costs fall into this category. An additional concern
is to select a wide enough range to include anticipated policy changes. In
the example, this was particularly important for the minimum length of service
necessary for retirement eligibility. If a system without a history is
simulated, the selection of a variable range is much more subjective and would
probably necessitate an expert judgment procedure to arrive at acceptable
ranges.. In any event, the procedure should use bounds that are consistent
with worst-case, best-case scenarios.
For example, the range for the discount rate (the government borrowing
rate) was 5 percent to 15 percent. This range encompassed the historical
performance of the 1960's (5 percent) and the possible interest rates of a
high inflationary period like the early 1980 ' s (15 percent). Value increments
were chosen on the basis of generating ten or more data points for the ensuing
regression analysis. Sampling from the permissable values used a normal
distribution centered on the most likely value. The bounds and step values
chosen for each of the variables selected for the analysis are discussed in
later sections.
Once the previous steps were completed, the simulation model was used to
develop the output for each of the variables at the selected values.
Regression analysis was then used to estimate analytical relationships between
total retirement cost and each of our selected variables. A criterion for the
existence of a usable functional relationship was a coefficient of
determination (R2) of .90 or higher. The output was used not only to develop
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the regression equation but also to conduct a sensitivity analysis of the
relationships.
INITIAL VALUE SELECTION
The initial input values selected to establish the baseline for the
sensitivity analysis are those used by the Defense Actuary in the Fiscal Year
82 Valuation of Military Pay
,
(U.S. Department of Defense, 1983) with the
single exception of the recommended discount rate. The Department of Defense
Actuary recommends a rate of 6 percent which is approximately the average
yield on long term U.S. securities for the period I960 through 1978. After
review of recent trends in long term U.S. government securities, a discount
rate of 9 percent was selected because the average interest rate has been 9.09
percent for 20 year U.S. government treasury securities for the period 1973 to
1983 (U.S. Department of Defense, Summer 1983). 3
Table 1 lists the input variable values, their abbreviations, their
controllability, and the resulting total retirement cost (TRC) (in millions
of dollars), when calculated for the Selected Baseline configuration. The
input values for those variables ending in "%" are the percentages used in
computation (e.g., a SAL% of 5.5 percent means a salary increase rate of 5.5
percent was used in computation). Input values for variables ending in "D"
are the incremental difference between the Department of Defense Actuary's
specific estimates and the amounts used in computation (e.g., an LEXPD of +1
means the actuarially computed life expectancies at retirement were all
extended by one year). The incremental difference values for those
actuarially computed variables are listed since each paygrade's individual
actuarial data (e.g., the life expectancy of a retiring 44 year old senior
enlisted is 30.24 years compared with 33.54 years for a 44 year old senior
officer) was used to provide greater accuracy. The length of service required
to retire (MLOS), is shown at its absolute input value and is neither a






Estimated Rate of Salary Increase
Percent of Base Pay at Retirement
Maximum Allowed Percent of Base Pay
Length of Service Required to Retire
Length of Service at Retirement
Life Expectancy at Retirement
Entrant Retirement Probability
Total Retirement Cost $1,210 M
Abbreviation Fed. Govt. DOD Value
DIS% No No 9%
SALX Yes No 5.5%
PAY% Yes No 2.5%
MAX% Yes No 75%




Table 1 may be interpreted as follows for the Selected Baseline: If one
assumes a discount rate of 9 percent, salary growth of 5.5 percent, a minimum
of 20 years of active service for retirement with retirement pay equal to 2.5
percent of the retirement basis per year served and a maximum rate of
retirement pay not exceeding 75 percent of the basis, and retention and
longevity statistics as computed by the Department of Defense Actuary, the
cost which should be accrued in 1983 to cover year groups 1953 through 1982




Table 2 presents the derived estimating equations. This table displays
the variable, its total annual retirement estimating equation, the
associated coefficient of determination (R?) and the increments (Inc) used to
generate the output from the simulation. Each equation is discussed
below.
TABLE 2
SELECTED BASELINE ESTIMATING EQUATIONS
Total Annual Retirement Cost
Variable Estimation Equation (In Millions) _R_£ Inc
DIS% Antilog ($ 9.15 - ($.226 x DIS%) ) .999 1%
SAL% $501.3 + ($133.3 x SAL%) .991 0.5%
PAY% $ .406 + ($484.6 x PAY%) .999 0.1%
MAX% -$895 - ($60.2 x MAX%) - ($0,429 x MAX% 2 ) .989 2.5%
ML0S $818.9 + ($ 19.6 x ML0S) .940 1%
L0SD $1,219 + ($ 19.7 x L0SD) .952 0.6%
LEXPD $1,214 + ($ 5.54 x LEXPD) .994 0.5%
ERP0 $1,212 + ($ 71.7 x ERP0) .999 0.006%
Discount Rate
The discount rate (DIS%) was examined over a range of 5 percent through
15 percent in 1 percent increments. The function which gave the highest
coefficient of determination (R2 = 99.9) was a logarithmic function in TRC =
$9.15 -($0,226 * DIS%).
Salary
The rate of salary increase (SAL%) was examined over a range of average
annual increase from 2.5 percent through 7.5 percent in .5 percent increments.
An R 2 of .991 was calculated from the linear function TRC = $501.3 +
($133.3 x SAL%).
Percent of Base Pay at Retirement
The percent of base pay (PAY%), is currently set at 2.5 percent per year
of active duty completed, with a minimum of 20 years duty required for
retirement. The total retirement amount cannot legally exceed 75 percent of
the final active duty base pay. The percent of base pay (PAY%) was examined
over a range of 2.0 percent through 3.0 percent in .1 percent increments. The
baseline configuration with a TRC of $1,210M is the PAY% value of 2.5 percent.
There is a clear relationship between reductions in percent of base pay
and resulting annual retirement costs: a given percentage reduction in the
first results in an equal percentage reduction in the latter. The linear
function TRC = $ .406 + ($484.6 * PAY%) provided an R 2 of .999.
Maximum Allowed Percent of Base Pay
The maximum percent of base pay (MAX%) is currently set by law at 75
percent of the final active base pay and is the upper bound. The maximum
percent of base pay, was examined over a range of 50 percent to 75 percent in
2.5 percent increments. The baseline configuration with a TRC of $1,2 10M is
the MAX% value of 75 percent. The results indicate a response pattern of an
initially strong positive relationship tapering to almost no effect at the
higher end of the MAX% range. The effect is caused by the relatively few
service members who remain for a full 30 year retirement and thereby encounter
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the 75 percent restriction. An R2 of .989 resulted from the parabolic
function TRC = -$895 + ($60.2 x MAX%) -($0,429 x MAX%2 ).
Minimum Length of Service To Retire
The current minimum length of service for retirement (MLOS) is 20 years.
The analysis examined the impact of adjusting the minimum retirement upward to
30 years in 1 year increments under two alternative attrition assumptions.
Under alternative A it was assumed that if a paygrade's average length of
service was less than the trial MLOS value, then the population of that
paygrade was retained until the minimum retirement point with the condition
that the population was decremented by 2 percent for each year of extension. 5
For example a First Class Petty Officer or Staff Sergeant, paygrade E6,
normally retires at 21.0 years of service. If the trial MLOS value was 23.0
years of service, then under alternative A the population of retiring E6's
would be reduced by (.98)2 f or the 2 years to a level of 96.04 percent of its
previous retirement population. Under alternative B no reduction was made in
the population of retiring E6's. These are arbitrary decrements which yielded
mixed results as displayed in Table 3. The two alternatives are believed to
bracket the actual leaving rates that would be encountered under changes in
minimum length of service to retirement. The baseline configuration with a
total annual retirement cost of $1,210M is associated with the minimum length














MINIMUM LENGTH OF SERVICE EFFECTS
Length of
Service Required Total Annual
to Retire Retirement Cost












A: attrition rate of 0.02 per year after 20 years
B: no attrition after 20 years
Under alternative A the data can be addressed as 3 clusters. There is no
effect on total annual retirement cost for an addition of 1 year (raising the
minimum length of service to 21 years). Between the years 22 and 25, there
appears to be no discernible pattern. Years 26 through 30 show a decreasing
trend. Under alternative B there is a monotonic increase in total annual
retirement cost from $1,210 M under 20 years minimum service for retirement to
$1,380 M for 30 years minimum service for retirement. The intriguing result
under alternative B is that increasing the minimum length of service to be
eligible for retirement increases total annual retirement costs. This is due
to the increase in percent of base pay that occurs with each year's addition
past 20 years of service.
No functional relationship meeting the R^ criteria of .90 was found for
alternative A. For alternative B, however, an R^ of .940 was calculated for
the linear function TARC = 818.9 + 19.6 ML0S.
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Length of Service at Retirement
For the sensitivity analysis of the length of service at retirement
(LOSD) variable, the variable value represents the value of the adjustment to
the Department of Defense Actuary's estimates. The average length of service
at retirement for each pay grade was examined over a range of 3 years less
than the current average to 3 years more than the current average, in .6 year
increments. 6
The baseline configuration with a TRC of $1 , 120M is associated with an
LOSD value of (meaning no adjustment to the average length of service at
retirement). The analysis of the total retirement cost changes resulting from
the variable indicate that the larger retirement annuity awarded for an
increased length of service is largely offset by the decreased life expectancy
of the later retirement. An increased liability of only $60M was incurred
when the average length of service was increased by 2 years, and a further
increase to 3 years resulted in virtually no increase in total retirement cost
beyond that of the 2 year extension. An R2 of .952 was calculated from the
linear function TRC = $1,219 + ($19.7 x LOSD).
Life Expectancy at Retirement
Sensitivity analysis of the life expectancy at retirement (LEXPD) was an
incremental analysis done in a manner similar to the length of service at
retirement. However, only increases to life expectancy were analyzed, since in
the United States, life expectancies have shown a strong tendency to increase
[2]. Therefore, life expectancy at retirement adjustments ranging from
increases of to 5 years in .5 year increments were explored.
The relationship of total annual retirement costs to the increasing life
expectancy at retirement appears to be linear. Minor increases in annual
retirement cost was anticipated since the annuity lengths supported by the
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life expectancy average approximately 32 years. At that distance from initial
funding, adjustments to the annuity lengths do not require equal increases in
costs recognized. An R 2 of .994 was associated with the linear function
TRC = $1,214 + ($5.54 x LEXPD).
Entrant Retirement Probability
For the entrant retirement probability the increments are changes in the
baseline probability. Entrant retirement probability (ERPD) adjustments of
.03 less than the current average probability to .03 more than the current
average probability were examined in .01 increments. The baseline
configuration with a TRC of $1,120M is the ERPD of (meaning no adjustment to
entrant retirement probability). When the total retirement cost was regressed
on entrant retirement probability the linear function TRC = $1,212 + ($71.7
x ERPD) yielded an R 2 of .999.
Each of the equations were developed from eleven data parts. Usually,
such small samples as used in the regression analysis of the sensitivity
results are of limited value. However, coefficients of determination as large
as those in Table 2 imply that the regression line is a good approximation of
the analytical relationship over the relevant range between TARC and the
associated variable. This method has fortunately generated apparently
reliable approximations to relationships that would have been yery difficult
to solve analytically.
RELATIVE IMPACT OF INDIVIDUAL VARIABLES
The equations derived in the previous section can be used to estimate the
relative impact of changes in the variables on future military retirement
costs. The variables are listed in Table 4 in the order of most sensitive to
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least sensitive as measured by the impact on total annual retirement costs of
a 10 percent change in the baseline input value of each variable. Listings
under the "Change in Total Annual Retirement Cost" heading show the difference
in millions of dollars of total annual retirement cost resulting from each 10
percent change. The associated percentage variation in baseline total annual
retirement cost caused by the incremental change are listed in the next
column. The heading "Controllability" refers to the previously discussed
controllability (C) or noncontrol labi 1 i ty (N) of the variable from the
perspective of the Department of Defense.
Two important caveats are necessary for properly interpreting this table.
First, tne relative ranking of elasticity values is not necessarily the
ranking of relative importance. A 10 percent change in length of service at
retirement yields a 3.8 percent change in total retirement costs while a 10
percent change in percent of base pay at retirement yields a 10 percent change
in total retirement. However, if a 10 percent change in length of service
at retirement is three times more likely to occur than a 10 percent change in
percent of base pay at retirement, then it may be argued that length of
service at retirement is more important than percent of base pay at
retirement. If large changes began to occur in uncontrollable factors
such that total force structure was being adversely affected, in all
likelihood compensating changes in controllable factors would be undertaken
in order to maintain the desired rank, paygrade and total size goals of the
Department of Defense. For example, with respect to the annual
discount rate, if changes in annual discount rates were beginning to have
substantial effects on force size or force structure, then compensatory
changes in current bonuses and salaries would probably be undertaken to
maintain force size or force structure goals.
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TABLE 4
INDIVIDUAL ENTRY AGE NORMAL SENSITIVITY RANKING*
Change in Percentage Change
DOD Total Annual in Total Annual
Variable Control lability Retirement Costa Retirement Cost b
Annual Discount Rate


























* from a 10% change in the baseline input value for each variable.
a The change in Total Annual Retirement Cost from the baseline value
of $1,210M.
b The change in Total Annual Retirement Cost divided by the baseline
Total Annual Retirement Cost value.
Of the variables controllable at the level of the DOD, adjustments to the
entrant retirement probability seem to offer the most promise in managing
retirement costs. It is interesting to note that an increase in length of
service at retirement of two years (10%) has a surprisingly low corresponding
retirement cost increase. Efforts to increase retention after retirement
eligibility is reached would increase the overall experience level of the
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service and (assuming experienced personnel perform better than inexperienced)
may produce a superior performance to cost ratio. Adjustments to length of
service required to retire has approximately the same impact on total annual
retirement cost as the length of service at retirement variable.
The second caveat is that each of the variable values which comprise the
baseline configuration differ in their inherent accuracy. The discount rate
(DIS%) and rate of salary increase (SAL%), being functions of future economic
performance, are both "soft" numbers in which excessive confidence should not
be placed. At the opposite end of the reliability spectrum are values for
percent of base pay at retirement (PAY%), maximum allowed percentage of base
pay (MAX%), and minimum length of service to retire (MLOS). Each of these
values is fixed in law and therefore will probably remain constant for the
long term. Confidence in variable values for retention until retirement
(ERPD), average length of service at retirement (LOSD), and life expectancy at
retirement (LEXPU) lies between the two ends of the spectrum discussed above.
Although only estimates, they have been subjected to actuarial review.
JOINT EFFECTS
An additional use of the regression approach for simply and quickly
predicting effects on system performance of changes in parametric values is to
estimate the complex joint effects interrelationships imbedded in the full
simulation model. Given the equations for the simple effects (Table 2), the
joint effects can be easily estimated. For instance, referring to Table 4,
Annual Discount Rate and Percent of Base Pay at Retirement ha^/e the highest
simple effects on changes in total retirement cost. If estimation of the
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joint effects of the two variables is desired, it is simply a matter of
combining the effects plus an interaction term, that is:
TRC = f(simple effect of DIS%, simple effect of PAY%, interaction
of DIS% and PAY%)
In this particular case the annual Discount Rate (DIS%) was estimated by a
logrithmic function and the effect of the changes in Percent of Base Pay at
Retirement (PAY%) were estimated directly from the PAY% data. Given these
relationships the functional form of the regression equation would be:
TRC = B + B^Log DIS%) + B 2 (PAY%) +B 3 (Log DIS%)(PAY%)
The estimates of the B's in the regression equation were developed in the
same manner as those for the simple effects. That is, the full simulation was
run changing the variables of interest, in this case DIS% and PAY%. In order
to insure that the effects of the interaction were captured the best
case-worst case senarios were used. The simulation model was run with the two
highest values for DIS% and PAY%, the two lowest values for DIS% and PAY% and






Additionally, random combinations of the two variables within the
appropriate ranges were generated using a normal distribution centered on the






the two variables. These data then were regressed to generate the following
equation yielding an R2 of .928:
TRC = -0.2562 + 0.1916(Log DIS%)-182.8025(PAY%)-239.9817(Log DIS%xPAY%)
This same method could be used to identify the interaction effects for
other combinations of interest. For the particular example used in this
paper, interaction effects were not of concern for estimating purposes.
CONCLUSION
The generic procedures discussed above present guidelines for using a
regression procedure to estimate equations that simply and quickly predict the
impact of changes in parameter values of complex relationships embedded in a
mathematical simulation model. The steps involved include establishment of
baseline values for all variables, selection of individual variables for
analysis, identification of the functional form of system performance and
individual variable relationship, selection of range and step values,
iteratively running the simulation model for sample individual variable values
to generate data for regression analysis, and estimation of the parametric
equations
.
The estimating relationship derived from a sensitivity analysis of a
simulation model can be used by policy makers to estimate the effects on total
system performance of a change in one of the primitive variables even though
the policy maker does not have hands-on access to the system computer
simulation model. In the retirement cost example presented above the
19
equations serve as a useful method for quickly estimating the impact of such
changes when the recalculation of the entry age normal model is not feasible,
such as during budget negotiations.
The same methodology which produced the estimating equations for the
retirement cost simulation model can be applied to economic, managerial or
legal input variable assumptions in simulation models to provide decision
makers with easy to use system performance estimators.
20
NOTES
1. The military retirement system is a defined benefit plan with voluntary
non-disability retirement authorized after 20 years of active military
service. The retiree receives 2.5 percent of active duty base pay for
each year of service up to 30 years. Depending upon date of original
enlistment, retired pay is either calculated using the final basic pay or
the last 36 months of basic pay. For Fiscal Year 1981 the outlays for
current retirees were $12.5 billion. (Aeila, 1980; U.S. Department of
Defense, 1976; U.S. Department of Defense 1976).
2. A full description of the variables and model can be obtained upon
request to the authors.
3. The 9 percent value also compares more favorably with the interest rates
promulgated by the Department of the Treasury pursuant to Public Law
92-41. This is the interest rate used by government estimators when
performing cost calculations which require a government cost of money.
This figure is actually a complex average of both government and low risk
private securities with 5 year maturities. Since it is a medium term
number, the 9 percent long term number was considered a better
estimator.
4. The manpower figures used in the calculations include only regular Navy
(USN), enlisted and officer personnel for the years 1953 through 1982.
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The calculated TRC includes neither disability nor survivor benefits,
which are not retirement costs in the strict sense, but the result of
military self-insurance and therefore not included in the individual
entry age normal computations.
5. The selection of 2% was arbitrary. A smaller percent loss would result
in greater annuity costs. Given the small loss ratio that is experienced
in years of service 6 to 20 when minimum length of service to retirement
is 20 years, 2% is a reasonable upper bound for losses prior to a new
minimum length of service required for retirement.
6. An important feature of the length of service at retirement computation
is that if the input of a negative L0S0 would reduce a pay grade's
average length of service to less than the minimum required for
retirement (currently 20 years), the input is disallowed, and the length
of service is reduced only to the minimum required for retirement. A
corresponding approach has been taken to the problem of age at
retirement. Any retirement at less than age 37 is not allowed, since the
minimum acceptable age for entry into the armed forces is 17 years and 20
years of service are required to retire (17 + 20 = 37).
22
REFERENCES
[1] AEILA (1980) "Military Retirement, The Administration's Plan and Related
Proposals." Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public
Research.
[2] American Council of Life Insurance (1982), 1982 Life Insurance Fact Book.
Washington, D. C.
[3] CBO (1978) "The Military Retirement System: Options for Change." Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office.
[4] Dreher, W.A. September (1967) "Alternatives Available Under APB Opinion No.
8: An Actuary's View," The Journal of Accountancy : 37-51.
[5] Friedman, L. and H. Friedman (1984) "Statistical Considerations in Computer




[6] Kleijnen, Jack P.C. (1979) "Regression Metamodels for Generalizing Simulation
Results," IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics , Vol. SMC-9,
No. 2.
[7] Kleijnen, Jack P.C. (1975) "A Comment on Blanning's "Metamodel for Sensitivity
Analysis: The Regression Metamodel in Simulation," Interfaces , Vol. 5, No,
3.
[8] Smith, U.F., September (1983) "A Sensitivity Analysis of Entry Age Normal
Military Retirement Costs, Unpublished Master's Thesis." Naval
Postgraduate School
.
[9] Tukey, J.W. (1977) Exploratory Data Analysis , Adison-Wesley, Reading, MA.
[10] U.S. Department of Defense (1976) "Third Quadrennial Review of Military
Compensation: Modernizing Military Pay," Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office.
[11] U.S. Department of Defense (1979) Military Retired Pay Manual, DoD Manual
1340. 12-M, Washington, U.C.
[12] U.S. Department of Defens (1983) "Valuation of the Military Retirement System,"
FY 1982, Office of the Actuary, Defense Manpower Data Center Alexandria,
VA.
[13] U.S. Department of the Treasur (Summer 1983) Treasury Bulletin, Washington,
D.C.: Office of the Secretary.
[14] Waterman, Steven (June 1983) "Allocation Methods for Use in the Accrual of




GENERAL INDIVIDUAL ENTRY AGE NORMAL VARIABLES
Description Variable
Annual Retired Annuity A
Actuarial Normal Cost AC
Annual Discount Rate DIS
Current Year Gains/Losses F
Current Year Applied Gains/Losses Fa
Deferred Gains/Losses Fd
Life Expectancy at Retirement LEXP
Number of Contribution Years n
Annual Normal Cost NC
Present Value of Retirement Benefits P
Current Year's Retirement Cost RC
Remaining Working-Life of Employee RWL
TABLE A-
2
MILITARY INDIVIDUAL ENTRY AGE NORMAL VARIABLES
Description Vari able
Final Monthly Base Pay BP
Current Base Pay at Retirement Grade PBc
Paygrade of Retiree G
Number of Entrants for a Given Year I
Length of Service at Retirement LOS
Minimum Length of Service Required to Retire MLOS
Expected Number of Retirees N
Probability of an Entrant Retiring
at a Given Paygrade, G p r(G)
Probability of an Entrant Reaching
Retirement, ERP
Retirement Percentage Rate RR
Percent of Base Pay at Retirement PAY%
Maximum Allowed Percent of Base Pay MAX%
Estimated Rate of Salary Increase SAL%
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